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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Miguel A. Gonzalez appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon 
his conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. Gonzalez 
challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
On February 11, 2014, Probation Officer Oscar Arguello received 
information that one of his probationers, Miguel Martinez, had been released 
from jail but had not checked in with the probation office. (7/18/2014 Tr., p.48, 
Ls.19-25.) As a result, Officer Arguello and Detective Courtney Dozier went to 
Martinez's residence. (7/18/2014 Tr., p.52, L.20 - p.53, L.2.) Upon arriving at 
the residence, Officer Arguello knocked on the door and, after "a while," 
Martinez's girlfriend, Yesenia Rangel, answered. (7/18/2014 Tr., p.54, L.21 -
p.55, L.13.) After Officer Arguello explained why he was there, Yesenia told him 
Martinez was still in custody. (7/18/2014 Tr., p.55, Ls.16-23.) Officer Arguello 
briefly checked the residence to confirm Martinez was not there, which Officer 
Arguello was authorized to do pursuant to the terms of Martinez's probation 
agreement. (7/18/2014 Tr., p.55, L.23 - p.56, L.16; Exhibit 1, p.2.) 
After checking the home for Martinez, Detective Dozier told Rangel and 
Gonzalez, who was sitting on the couch when the officers arrived, that he could 
smell the odor of freshly burnt marijuana. (7/18/2014 Tr., p.56, L.24 - p.57, 
L.21; 7/21/2014 Tr., p.106, L.17 - p.107, L.24.) Officer Arguello also smelled the 
same odor. (7/18/2014 Tr., p.57, Ls.8-10.) Ra,ngel and Gonzalez both denied 
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noticing the smell. (7/18/2014 Tr., p.58, Ls.5-10; 7/21/2014 Tr., p.111, 5.) 
Detective Dozier then separated Rangel from Gonzalez and advised her of the 
potential consequences of using drugs in the presence of young children, which 
could include the child being removed from the home; during this time, Officer 
Arguello stayed in the living room with Gonzalez and made "small talk." 
(7/18/2014 Tr., p.62, Ls.14-18, p.67, Ls.13-21; 7/21/2015 Tr., p.111, Ls.8-11; 
see 7/30/2014 Tr., p.178, Ls.13-17 (district court's factual findings regarding 
interaction between Detective Dozier and Rangel).) After this conversation, 
Detective Dozier and Rangel returned to the living room where Gonzalez was, 
and Detective Dozier told them they were both "detained" and "not free to leave." 
(Exhibit i; 7/21/2014 Tr., p.114, L.24 - p.115, L.21.) At that time, Detective 
Dozier told them to put their phones on the table to "prevent" them "from calling 
or texting anybody." (Exhibit 2; 7/21/2014 Tr., p.115, Ls.22-25.) Less than one 
minute later, Gonzalez, without being asked and not in response to any question, 
gave Detective Dozier marijuana he had in his pocket. (Exhibit 2; 7/21/2014 Tr., 
p.116, Ls.1-4.) Detective Dozier arrested Gonzalez shortly thereafter and, during 
1 Exhibit 2 is a portion of Detective Dozier's audio recording of his interaction with 
Rangel and Gonzalez, which the state admitted at the suppression hearing; 
Exhibit 2 is four minutes and 38 seconds long. (7/21/2014 Tr., p.124, L.13.) 
Gonzalez, however, admitted the entire audio as Exhibit C, but that exhibit is not 
included in the record on appeal. (7/21/2014 Tr., p.128, L.11 - p.129, L.3; 
Certificate of Exhibits (noting Exhibit C could not be copied and was retained by 
the district court).) In its decision, the court indicated Exhibit C lasted 24 minutes 
(7/30/2014 Tr., p.179, Ls.13-14); Exhibit 2 is the first 4 minutes and 38 seconds 
of Exhibit C (see 7/21/2014 Tr., p.129, L.13 - p.130, L.1; 7/30/2014 Tr., p.179, 
Ls.13-16). To the extent applicable, missing portions of the record are presumed 
to support the district court's decision. Grant v. State, 156 Idaho 598, 605 n.5, 
329 P.3d 380, 387 n.5 (Ct. App. 2014) ("missing portions of the record must be 
presumed to support the action of the trial court"). 
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a search incident to arrest, Detective Dozier found methamphetamine. (Exhibit 
2; see 7/30/2014 Tr., p.178, L.25 - p.179, L.2 (district court found that "after the 
search incident to arrest, the officers found a little bit of methamphetamine in a 
cigarette pack on his person").) 
The state charged Gonzalez with possession of methamphetamine. (R., 
pp.12-13, 31-32.) Gonzalez filed a motion to suppress, claiming he was 
"searched and . . . seized . . . without reasonable articulable suspicion or 
probable cause to believe a crime had been committed." (R., p.44.) Gonzalez 
sought suppression of all items found in the residence or on his person, any 
items "pertaining" to him, any statements made by him, and "[a]ny and all items 
obtained as the 'fruit' of all illegally obtained items." (R., p.44.) The court 
conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied Gonzalez's motion. (See generally 
7/18/2014 Tr. (hearing); 7/21/2014 Tr. (hearing cont.); 7/30/2014 Tr. (decision).) 
Gonzalez thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to the possession charge, 
reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, after which the 
court imposed a suspended five-year sentence with two years fixed. (R., pp.104-
116, 125-127.) 
Gonzalez timely appealed. (R., pp .139-141 . ) 
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ISSUE 
Gonzalez states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Gonzalez's motion to 
suppress because Mr. Gonzalez was under de facto arrest by the 
time he handed over the marijuana? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Gonzalez failed to show that the district court erred in rejecting his claim that 
his detention amounted to a de facto arrest? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Rejecting 
Gonzalez's Claim That His Detention Amounted To A De Facto Arrest 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Gonzalez's suppression motion, ruling, in 
relevant part, that there was no de facto arrest. On appeal, Gonzalez is "mindful 
that the officers detained [him] to investigate the smell of marijuana," but 
nevertheless claims "the circumstances surrounding this incident show that he 
was under de facto arrest by the time he handed the officers the marijuana" and 
the "arrest was not supported by probable cause." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
Application of the correct legal standards to the facts shows what Gonzalez 
effectively concedes - his detention did not amount to a de facto arrest and, as a 
result, Gonzalez was not entitled to suppression. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the 
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found." State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
5 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That, Under The Relevant Legal 
Standards, The Investigative Detention Did Not Rise To The Level Of A 
De Facto Arrest 
A de facto arrest can result only if the police engaged in conduct that "was 
more intrusive or of longer duration than reasonably necessary to effectuate the 
investigative detention." State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362, 17 P.3d 301, 
306 (Ct. App. 2000). There is no bright line rule for determining when an 
investigative detention has escalated into an arrest. "Much as a 'bright line' rule 
would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is 
unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over 
rigid criteria." State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 423, 901 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1995). 
Thus, in determining whether an investigative detention has become an arrest, 
the reviewing "[c]ourt must consider all of the surrounding circumstances and 
determine whether the investigative methods employed were the least intrusive 
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short 
period of time." State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 368, 986 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Ct. 
App. 1999) .. Factors to be considered in the analysis include "'the seriousness of 
the crime, the location of the encounter, the length of the detention, the 
reasonableness of the officer's display of force, and the conduct of the suspect 
as the encounter unfolds."' !_g_. (quoting State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 431, 
925 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
The district court recited the factors applicable to its de facto arrest 
analysis, applied them to the evidence presented, and concluded no de facto 
arrest occurred. (7/30/2014, p.182, L.21 - p.184, L.8.) The district court's 
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conclusion was correct. Officer Arguello and Detective Dozier lawfully entered 
Martinez's home pursuant to the Fourth Amendment waiver Martinez signed as 
part of his probationary terms (Exhibit 1 ). See State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 
364, _, 347 P.3d 1025, 1031 (Ct. App. 2015) (Fourth Amendment waivers as a 
condition of probation or parole "operate as consents to search" and "if a parole 
or probation officer is justified in making a search, he or she may enlist the aid of 
police officers in performing that duty."). While lawfully in Martinez's home, 
where Gonzalez was visiting, Detective Dozier developed reasonable articulable 
suspicion that someone in the residence had been smoking marijuana. 
(7/30/2014 Tr., p.177, L.7 - p.178, L.7.) In order to confirm or dispel that 
suspicion, Detective Dozier separated the two adults inside - Rangel and 
Gonzalez - and spoke with Rangel about his suspicions. (7/30/2014 Tr., p.178, 
Ls.8-16.) After this conversation, Rangel became upset at the prospect of 
having her daughter removed from a home where drugs were being used and, 
apparently in response to Rangel crying, Gonzalez voluntarily removed 
marijuana from his pocket. (7/30/2014 Tr., p.178, Ls.23-25.) The district court 
found "the detention between when the officers arrived at the residence and 
when the marijuana was pulled out of [Gonzalez's] clothing was between 20 and 
30 minutes." (7/30/2014 Tr., p.179, Ls.20-22; see also p.183, Ls.8-10, p.184, 
Ls.3-4.) The court further found the "detention" was "reasonably related to the 
circumstances of the case" and was "not too long." (7/30/2014 Tr., p.184, Ls.2-
4.) 
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On appeal, Gonzalez does not challenge any of the district court's factual 
findings, but instead asserts that the court's conclusion that there was no de 
facto arrest was erroneous despite the fact that Detective Dozier was 
"investigat[ing] the smell of marijuana." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Gonzalez cites 
the following factors in support of his argument: (1) Detective Dozier was 
investigating "misdemeanor possession and injury to child"; (2) the "entire 
incident took place in Ms. Rangel's apartment and lasted at least twenty to thirty 
minutes"; (3) Detective Dozier "at some point" advised Gonzalez and Rangel 
they were detained; (4) Rangel and Gonzalez did not consent to any search; (5) 
Gonzalez was told he could not smoke a cigarette and was told to put "his phone 
down"; and (6) Detective Dozier "threatened to call Health and Welfare and have 
Ms. Rangel's daughter taken away." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) None of these 
factors demonstrate error in the district court's finding that there was no de facto 
arrest. If anything, the factors Gonzalez highlights support the district court's 
conclusion. Indeed, a number of factors Gonzalez relies on show nothing more 
than that Gonzalez was, "at some point," detained. That Gonzalez was detained 
is, however, insufficient to show that there was a de facto arrest. The evidence 
presented supports the district court's conclusion that there was no de facto 
arrest given the reasonable length of the detention, the fact that the encounter 
occurred in Rangel's "private residence," where Gonzalez was voluntarily visiting, 
and the absence of any display of force. (7/30/2014 Tr., p.183, Ls.1-21.) 
Gonzalez has failed to show otherwise. Compare, Frank, 133 Idaho at 369, 986 
8 
P.2d at 1035 (under facts of case, handcuffing suspect and placing him in the 
back of a patrol car did not transform investigatory stop into a de facto arrest). 
Because the officers' conduct was reasonable and did not transform the 
investigative detention into a de facto arrest, Gonzalez has failed to show any 
basis for reversal of the district court's order denying his motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of 
conviction entered upon Gonzalez's conditional guilty plea to possession of 
methamphetamine. 
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